Altruism: helping others

Altruism is a quality diametrically opposed to selfishness. An altruist is not indifferent and is ready to help completely selflessly, even when he is not offered anything in return and when he does not expect any gratitude. A classic example of altruism is the biblical parable of the good Samaritan. [The Samaritans are an ethnic group and religious sect in Palestine that originated in the 16th century. from Judaism. – Note. translated by]

“One man, returning from Jerusalem to Jericho, fell into the hands of bandits, who beat him to a pulp, robbed him and abandoned him on the road. A priest passing by, seeing the dying man, crossed over to the other side. The Levite who followed him did the same. [Levites are the servants of the religious cult of the ancient Jews. – Note. perev. But when the Samaritan saw the unfortunate man, his heart was filled with compassion, and he approached him. Bending over the dying man, he washed his wounds with oil and wine and bandaged them. Then he put him on his donkey, brought him to the inn and took care of him. The next day, he took out two denarii, gave them to the innkeeper, and told him, “Take care of him. If this money is not enough, I will return and pay you back” (Luke 10:30-35).

This Samaritan is a symbol of pure altruism. Feeling compassion for a complete stranger and expecting neither reward nor gratitude, he spared no time, effort, or money for him.

To understand the nature of altruistic acts, social psychologists study the conditions under which they occur. But before we turn to the results of their research, let’s look at the motivation of altruism. Three complementary theories give some ideas about it.

One possible explanation for altruism is contained in the theory of social exchange: human interaction is guided by the “social economy.” We exchange not only material values and money, but also such social values as love, services, information, and status (Foa & Foa, 1975). At the same time, we use a minimax strategy – we strive to minimize our own costs and get the maximum possible reward. Social exchange theory does not claim that we consciously “track” costs and rewards; it only assumes that such reasoning predicts our behavior.

Imagine that there is a search for donors on your campus and you are asked to donate your blood. Won’t you weigh the possible negative consequences of consent (painful procedure, loss of time, fatigue) and rejection (guilt, dissatisfaction with yourself)? And can you not compare the positive consequences of both actions, which is, on the one hand, satisfaction with having helped someone and a free breakfast if you agree, and on the other, saved time, nerves and well-being if you refuse? During the study of donors in Wisconsin, in full accordance with the theory of social exchange, it was experimentally confirmed that such hidden calculations always precede the decision whether to provide assistance or not (Piliavinetal., 1982). As if looking for an excuse to justify their own generosity, people donate more money to charity when they receive something in return, such as sweets or candles. Even if they don’t need what they get and would never buy it themselves, the very fact that there is a social exchange is important (Holmesetal., 1997).

Dennis Krebs writes: “I owe my interest in altruism to the generosity of those people who helped me free myself from my past” (Krebs, 1999). After moving from Vancouver, British Columbia, to California, Krebs, a 14-year-old high school student, turned from a leader into an outsider. His repeated run-ins with the law ended first with being sent to a penal colony for juvenile delinquents, and then to prison, from where he escaped. After returning to British Columbia, Krebs enrolled at the university, graduated brilliantly and was accepted into the doctoral program at Harvard University. However, the past would not let him go; fearing the inevitable publicity – after all, he was back in California – Krebs told everything about himself, but in the end, thanks to the support of many people, he was forgiven and subsequently became a professor at Harvard University and head of the Department of Psychology at Simon Fraser University. “I told people my life story,” Krebs says, “to convince those of them who had already taken a couple of hits to stay in the game.”

The rewards that motivate assistance can be external and internal. When a business donates money to charity to make its corporate image more attractive, or when someone offers a ride to someone based on gratitude or friendship, we are talking about an external reward. We give in order to receive. This means that we are more likely to help those who like us and whose approval we seek to earn (Krebs, 1970; Unger, 1979).

The rewards we receive by helping others also include internal self-rewards. When we are with someone who is upset about something, we tend to sympathize with them. If you hear a woman’s scream through the window, you will be alarmed and scared. If you cannot interpret this cry as joking or playful, then in order to calm down, you will try to find out what is the matter or provide help (Piliavin&Piliavin, 1973). Dennis Krebs (1975) proved experimentally that this is indeed the case.: those of his subjects, students at Harvard University, whose self-reports and physiological reactions testified to the most emotional perception of someone else’s trouble, provided the most significant help to the person who got into it. Everett Sanderson, who saved a girl who fell from a platform at a subway station, said: “If I hadn’t tried to save this little girl, if I had just stood and waited for the outcome like everyone else, my soul would have died. And I would never forgive myself for that.”

By doing altruistic things, we grow in our own eyes. Almost all of the donors who participated in the study conducted by Jane Pilyavin agreed that donation “makes a person respect themselves” and “gives them a sense of self-satisfaction.” Knowing this makes it easier to understand why people tip waiters, even if they know they will never return to this restaurant, and show kindness to strangers they will never see again.

After analyzing the motivation of volunteers, in particular those who care for AIDS patients, Mark Snyder, Allen Omoto, and Jill Clary identified six motivating reasons (Clary &Snyder, 1993, 1995; Claryetal., 1998, 1999).

– Moral reasons: the desire to act in accordance with universal human values and caring for others.

– Cognitive reasons: the desire to get to know people better or acquire skills.

– Social reasons: become a member of the group and earn approval.

– Career considerations: the acquired experience and contacts are useful for further career advancement.

– Self-defense: the desire to get rid of feelings of guilt or escape from personal problems.

– Increase self-esteem: strengthen self-esteem and self-confidence.

Such cost-benefit calculations may seem humiliating. However, defenders of the theory of social exchange have legitimate questions.: What is offensive to humanity that we enjoy helping others? Doesn’t that do her credit? Doesn’t it do her credit that we often behave not antisocially, but “prosocially”? Is it that we realize ourselves by giving our love to others? How much worse it would be for all of us if we enjoyed taking care only of ourselves.

“That’s right,” some readers may object to me. – And yet, doesn’t it follow from the theory of social exchange that helping is never a truly altruistic act and that we only call it “altruistic” because the benefits from it are not obvious? If we help a woman in trouble in order to earn social approval, get rid of our own feelings of anxiety and possible remorse, or grow up in our own eyes, can such help be called altruistic?” This argument is a reminiscence of B. F. Skinner’s analysis of altruism (V.F.Skinner, 1971). “We honor people only for their good deeds, which we cannot explain,” he said. We attribute the reasons for their actions to internal dispositions only when we lack external ones. If there are external causes, we are talking about them, not about the person.

However, the theory of social exchange has a weak side. It easily descends to a “naming explanation.” If a girl participates in the Big Sister teacher training program as a volunteer, it is tempting to “explain” her actions dictated by sympathy by saying that they bring her satisfaction. But such an “after the fact” designation of remuneration creates a vicious circle: “Why is she working as a volunteer?” – “To get an inner reward.” “How do you know that it’s about internal reward?” “What else could have motivated her to do this?” For this reason, the ideology of selfishness, the essence of which is that all actions are explained by the personal interests of the one who commits them, and has compromised itself in the eyes of researchers. The ultimate goal of an egoist is to improve his own situation, the ultimate goal of an altruist is to improve the situation of another person.

“Men value only those good deeds that bring rewards. Ovid, Letters from Pontus”

To avoid this kind of circularity, we must determine rewards and costs independently of altruistic behavior. If social approval drives help, we need to get experimental evidence that if help is followed by approval, help increases. And so it is (Staub, 1978). But that’s not all. Cost-benefit analysis gives us something else. It suggests that passive witnesses to crimes or accidents are not necessarily indifferent people. In fact, they may be genuinely agitated by what is happening, but the realization of what their intervention may turn out to be paralyzes their will.

Is it true that the only goal is guided by heroes who save people, unknown donors and Peace Corps volunteers [The Peace Corps is an organization established in 1961 in the United States and unites qualified teachers, construction workers and other professionals working on a voluntary basis in developing countries. – Note. perev.], – selfless concern for others? Or do they always strive for one thing – to satisfy their own needs in one form or another: to receive a reward, to avoid punishment or guilt, or to get rid of mental discomfort?

An episode from the life of Abraham Lincoln serves as an illustration of this philosophical problem. During the mail coach ride, he discussed it with his traveling companion. No sooner had Lincoln said that all good deeds are done through selfishness, than he noticed a pig that was screaming its head off. It turned out that her piglets were drowning, having fallen into the pond. After asking the coachman to stop, Lincoln jumped out of the carriage, rushed to the pond and pulled the piglets onto dry land. When he got back into the carriage, his companion remarked, “Well, Abe, what does selfishness have to do with what just happened?” – “For God’s sake, Ed! The most direct! I would have been restless all day if I had left this unfortunate family to their fate! Don’t you understand that I did this just so that my conscience wouldn’t torment me?” (Sharp, cited in:Batsonetal., 1986). Until recently, psychologists agreed with Lincoln.

However, psychologist Daniel Bateson believes that our willingness to help others is the result of both reasons – concern for our own interests and altruistic considerations (Figure 12.1) (Batson, 2001).

Figure 12.1. Assistance: mechanisms based on selfishness and altruism. The sight of someone else’s misfortune can cause a person to have mixed feelings – focus on their own mental discomfort and empathy for someone who is suffering. Researchers agree that one’s own mental discomfort “triggers” a mechanism based on selfish motives. But the question of whether empathy is capable of “triggering” the mechanism of genuine altruism remains debatable. (Source:Batson,Fultz&Schoenrade, 1987)

The mental discomfort that we experience when watching another person suffer motivates us to get rid of them, and we can do this either by passing by an unpleasant situation (this is exactly what the priest and Levite did), or by providing help (like a Samaritan). But, according to Bateson and his colleagues, we also experience empathy, especially if someone close to us is suffering. Loving parents suffer and rejoice with their children; empathy is unknown to those who abuse children and are generally prone to cruelty (Miller&Eisenberg, 1988). We also feel empathy for those with whom we identify. In September 1997, Princess Diana of England and her orphaned sons were mourned by millions of people who had never seen her in their lives, but perceived her as a loved one thanks to hundreds of newspaper articles and 44 editorials in People magazine; however, those same people remained completely indifferent to the fate of the million unnamed Rwandans who were killed or died after 1994 in refugee camps.

When we feel compassion, we don’t think so much about ourselves as about the one who is suffering. Sincere sympathy and empathy compel us to help a person for his own sake. This feeling arises quite naturally. Frans de Waal describes many cases when, during a fight, one monkey or monkey came to the rescue of another, hugged her or expressed her emotional support in some other way. Even babies who are only one day old cry more when they hear other children crying (Hoffman, 1981). In maternity hospitals, it’s worth crying alone, as a whole chorus of crying voices immediately joins him. Apparently, the ability to empathize is an innate human quality.

Often, reactions to crisis situations are the result of the combined action of mental discomfort and empathy. In 1983, people watched on television as a forest fire destroyed hundreds of apartment buildings near Melbourne (Australia). When Paul Amato later became interested in financial and property donations, it turned out that those who were angry or indifferent were less generous than those who experienced either mental discomfort (they were so shocked that they became ill) or empathy (compassion for people left homeless) (Amato, 1986). The generosity of children also depends on their susceptibility to mental discomfort and their ability to empathize. George Knight and his colleagues at Arizona State University found that some children between the ages of 6 and 9 are more likely than others to sympathize with those who are sad and those who are teased (Knightetal, 1994). These sympathetic children turned out to be the most generous when, after showing a video recording of a girl burned in a fire, they were given the opportunity to donate part of the money they received for participating in the experiment to the children affected by the fire.

To separate the selfish desire to reduce mental discomfort from altruistic empathy, a group of researchers led by Bateson conducted experiments in which subjects previously found themselves in situations that caused them to feel empathy. Next, the researchers observed exactly how excited people would act to calm down: they would pass by someone in need of help or try to help him. The results confirmed the researchers’ assumptions: people whose sense of empathy was previously “awakened” by certain actions of the experimenters, as a rule, helped.

In one of these experiments, female students at the University of Kansas observed the “suffering” of a young woman when she allegedly received an electric shock (Batsonetal., 1981). During the pause, the “victim”, whose suffering no one doubted, explained to the experimenter the origin of her hypersensitivity to electric current: it turns out that in childhood she fell on a fence that was energized. Sympathizing with her, the experimenter suggested the following way out: to bring the experiment to an end, ask the observer (whose role was played by the real subject) if she would agree to switch places with her and take on the remaining blows. Previously, half of the real subjects were convinced that the “victim” was a person close to them in spirit, who shared their moral values and interests, which aroused their empathy. The second group of subjects was also told that their participation in the experiment was over and that they would not have to watch the “sufferings of the victim” if they had to be prolonged. Nevertheless, almost all the participants in the experiment, whose empathy the researchers had previously “awakened”, expressed their willingness to switch places with the “victim”.

(“What’s the matter with you, mister? Is there anything I can help you with?

– Young man, you are the only one who paid attention to me and stopped! I’m a millionaire, and the $5,000 is yours!)

You never know what kind of reward awaits you if you help someone in trouble.

“No matter how selfish a person may be, in our opinion, it is obvious that there is something in his nature that makes him interested in the well-being of others and in their happiness, although he himself receives nothing from this except the pleasure that their contemplation brings him. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Feelings, 1759”

Can this be called genuine altruism? Mark Schaller and Robert Cialdini doubt this (Schaller &Cialdini, 1988). They believe that a person who sympathizes with the sufferer is in a bad mood. They managed to convince participants in one of their experiments that their mood could be improved by some “more optimistic” impression, such as listening to a funny audio recording. Under such conditions, people with empathy were not particularly eager to help. The conclusion reached by Schaller and Cialdini is as follows: even when we feel empathy for the victim, we do not rush to help if we know that we have another way to improve our mood.

The results of other studies suggest that genuine altruism does exist.:

– Empathy makes it necessary to help even members of rival groups, but only if the helper is confident that his help will not be rejected (Batsonetal., 1997; Dovidioetal., 1990).

– People who have awakened compassion will come to the rescue, even if no one ever finds out about it. Their efforts will continue until those who need help receive it (Fultetal., 1986). And if these efforts fail through no fault of their own, they will worry anyway (Batson & Weeks, 1996).

– In some cases, people persist in their desire to help a suffering person even when they think that their bad mood is a temporary result of the action of a special psychotropic drug (Schroeder et al., 1988).

– If a person sympathizes with the sufferer, in order to do for him what he needs, he violates his own rules and ideas about decency and justice (Batsonetal., 1997; 1999). The paradox is as follows: that is why altruism based on empathy “can pose a great threat to public morality, because it makes me primarily care about the one I love most, about a friend in need, and makes me immune to the suffering of a bleeding crowd.” It is not surprising that our mercy is often limited by the walls of our homes.

So, everyone agrees that in some cases, assistance is dictated either by outright selfishness (help is provided in order to either receive a reward or avoid punishment) or by veiled selfishness (help is provided in order to regain mental comfort). Is there a third motive, altruism, whose sole purpose is the well–being of another person, and the happiness of the one who helps is just a “by–product”? Can empathy-based care be called a source of such altruism? Cialdini (1991), as well as his colleagues Mark Schaller and Jim Fultz, still doubt this and note that none of the experiments excludes absolutely all possible selfish explanations for helping.

“The best way to tell who we really are is to do things that we would do if we were sure that no one would ever know about them. English historian and essayist Thomas McAuley (1800-1859), paraphrase”

After conducting 25 experiments examining altruistic and egoistic empathy as alternative motives for helping, Bateson (2001) and others (Dovidio, 1991; Staub, 1991; Wallach &Wallach, 1983) were convinced: Sometimes people are able to focus not on their own well-being, but on the well-being of others. Bateson, who studied theology and philosophy in his youth, began studying this problem, feeling “delighted with one thought: if we could get indisputable evidence that helping is a manifestation of sincerity and not veiled selfishness, we could look at the fundamental aspect of human nature in a completely new way” (Batson, 1999a). Two decades later, he believes he has found the answer to his question. Sincere, “empathically motivated altruism is part of human nature” (Batson, 1999b). And this, Bateson continues, gives rise to hope – the research results show its validity – that empathy can improve attitudes towards those who are currently in the position of outcasts: HIV-infected, homeless, prisoners and representatives of other minorities.

During the Vietnam War, 63 soldiers received awards for covering their comrades with their own bodies during the explosions (Hunt, 1990). Most of them were part of combat units, whose members were connected by strong bonds of friendship. Most of them covered unexploded grenades with their own bodies. 59 people died. Unlike other altruists, in particular those “non-Jewish righteous men” who, as is now commonly believed, saved 200,000 Jews from the Nazis, these soldiers did not have time to reflect either on the fact that cowardice is a shameful quality, or on eternal gratitude for self–sacrifice. Nevertheless, something made them do what they did.

Source: Myers D. “Social Psychology”

Photo: i.mycdn.me