Some of the problems that pose the greatest threat to the future of all mankind – nuclear weapons, climate warming, overpopulation, depletion of mineral reserves – arise due to the fact that different groups pursue only their own interests, the paradox is that their activities are to the detriment of all. Someone might think, “Environmental measures are going to cost me a lot of money. But why? Our emissions are non-toxic.” Many others think the same way, and as a result, we breathe poisoned air and drink dirty water. In some societies, it is beneficial to have many children: it is believed that children are helpers in household chores and a guarantee of parental well–being in old age. But when most families have many children, society is threatened with extinction due to overpopulation. Society suffers from what the individual benefits from. This means that we are facing a very difficult dilemma.: How can the well-being of individuals, including the realization of their right to self-satisfaction, be combined with the well-being of society as a whole? To highlight and illustrate this dilemma, social psychologists use laboratory games that reflect the nature of many social conflicts. By showing how people who are guided by good intentions become involved in behaviors that are destructive to both sides, these games highlight some of the paradoxes of human existence that cause not only admiration, but also anxiety. “The position of social psychologists studying conflict is in many ways similar to that of astronomers,– says conflict specialist Morton Deutsch. – We do not have the opportunity to study large-scale social phenomena in the laboratory. But we can identify conceptual similarities between the large-scale and the small, just as astronomers have identified what planets and Newton’s apple have in common. That is why the games played in our laboratories by the subjects can deepen our understanding of war, peace and social justice” (Deutsch, 1999). Consider two examples: the prisoner’s dilemma and the tragedy of communal evictions.

This dilemma is derived from the story of two suspects who were interrogated separately by the district attorney (Rapoport, 1960). Both are guilty of the same crime, but the prosecutor only has evidence of their involvement in a less serious crime. And he offers everyone to confess in private on favorable terms: if only one confesses, the prosecutor guarantees release from punishment to the one who confesses (and uses his confession to sentence the second to the maximum term). If both confess, both will be sentenced to average terms of imprisonment. If no one confesses, both will receive minimal punishment. In a generalized form, all these options are presented in the form of a matrix in Figure 13.1. Would you admit it yourself if you were faced with such a dilemma?

Figure 13.1. Prisoner’s dilemma. The number in each square above the diagonal is the prison sentence awaiting prisoner A. If both confess, each gets 5 years. If none of them confesses, each gets 1 year. If one person confesses, they are released in exchange for information that will be used to sentence the other to 10 years in prison. Imagine that you are one of the prisoners and are deprived of the opportunity to communicate with your accomplice. Would you admit it? To ease their own fate, many would have confessed, despite the fact that two confessions would entail a heavier punishment than two “non-confessions.” Pay attention to the matrix: no matter what the other person decides, it is more beneficial for everyone to confess. If the second one is also recognized, he will receive an average term instead of the longest. If the second one does not confess, he is released. Of course, each of the accused understands this. So, we are facing a social trap. About 2,000 laboratory studies were conducted: the subjects, university students, faced different versions of the prisoner’s dilemma (it was not about prison terms, but about chips, money, or points that were taken into account when assessing knowledge in this course) (Dawes, 1991). As follows from Figure 13.2, no matter what decision one player makes, it is more profitable for the second player to think only about himself (because it is this strategy that allows him to benefit from the willingness to cooperate of the second player and protects himself from exploitation by him). However, and this is exactly where the dog is buried, by not cooperating with each other, both condemn themselves to a much worse ending than the one they could have reached if they had trusted each other and could count on common benefits. This dilemma often drives both of them into a situation in which they almost go crazy with annoyance: realizing that both could benefit from cooperation, they put themselves in such conditions where cooperation turned out to be impossible, since they are unable to communicate and do not trust each other.

Figure 13.2. Laboratory version of the prisoner’s dilemma. The numbers indicate some kind of reward, such as money. The numbers in the squares above the diagonal are Player A’s winnings. In such dilemmas, the desire to satisfy one’s own interests at all costs can have devastating consequences for everyone. This is exactly what happened as a result of the arms race that began between the United States and the former Soviet Union after 1945. Any observer on another planet would most likely call this military doctrine of “guaranteed mutual destruction” MADNESS, in full accordance with its acronym. [The English abbreviation of this military doctrine is MAD, which means “crazy, crazy.” – Note. perev. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower complained about this: “Every cannon, every warship launched, every rocket fired into the sky means, in the end, the robbery of those who are hungry but unable to satisfy their hunger, and those who are freezing but have no clothes. The weapons that fill the world are not just money spent. This is the sweat of workers, the talent of scientists, and the hopes of children.… What we have cannot be called life, at least not real life. Humanity is crucified on an iron cross, and the threat of war looms over it.” Perhaps sometimes maintaining a “balance of intimidation” really helps prevent a war that would be inevitable if one country turned out to be much weaker than the other. However, both historical experience and the data obtained by psychologists, which will be discussed below, indicate the failure of those who think that war can be prevented by threatening the enemy with such a large “club” as nuclear weapons (Lebow&Stein, 1987). In the entire history of mankind, there have never been more wars in a single decade than in the heavily armed 80s of the twentieth century (Sivard, 1991). Moreover, the peoples of all countries would live in greater security if there were no military threat at all and if governments spent money not on weapons, but on more productive needs. In countries where the population is fighting for the right to own firearms for self-defense, a paradoxical situation is emerging: the armed population is less safe than the unarmed. It’s easy to say, but the dilemma faced by national leaders, as well as university students who participate in laboratory dramatizations of the arms race dilemma, is this: unilateral disarmament makes those who disarm vulnerable to attack or blackmail. In laboratory conditions, subjects who unconditionally adopt a cooperative strategy often become exploited (Oskamp, 1971; Reychler, 1979; Shuretal., 1965). So, alas! – the cost of armaments remains.

In many social dilemmas, there are more than two participants. Global climate warming is a consequence of widespread deforestation and excessive levels of carbon dioxide in the air, a product of the combustion of gasoline and diesel fuel and coal, which many power plants use. Each car makes its own negligible contribution to the overall picture, but the harm it causes affects many people. To simulate such difficult social situations, researchers have developed laboratory dilemmas that involve many people. “National policy, the essence of which is peace enforcement, multiplied by two, inevitably leads to an arms race. Levinger, 1987» A symbol, or metaphorical image, of the insidious nature of such social dilemmas is what environmentalist Garrett Hardin called the “tragedy of community evictions” (Hardin, 1968). The term “communal pastures” in old England referred to pastures located in the center of cities, but it is clear that the role of “communal pastures” can be air, water, whales or biscuits, i.e. any limited resource in common ownership. If everyone consumes it in reasonable quantities, its reserves are replenished as fast as it “matures”. The grass will grow, the whales will bring offspring, and the cookie reserves will be replenished. Excessive consumption will lead to a “tragedy of communal evictions.” Imagine that 100 farmers collectively use a pasture capable of feeding 100 cows. As long as each of them has one cow, the pasture is being used in the “optimal mode”. But then one of them starts thinking something like this: “If I get a second cow, my profit will double, and the grass from this will practically not decrease, well, maybe just a little bit.” And he brings a second cow. Other farmers are following his example. The inevitable result? The tragedy of communal pastures is a piece of land trampled by animals, on which not a blade of grass remains. There are many similar events in real life. When Internet users, thinking only of their own interests, uncontrollably clog communication channels with graphic information, its normal operation is disrupted (Huberman&Lukose, 1997). The same can be said about environmental pollution: total pollution consists of a huge number of minor emissions, each of which brings significantly more benefits to its “author” than he (and the environment) could receive if he stopped his activities, which result in harmful emissions. We litter in public places – in the living rooms of dormitories, in parks and in zoo gardens, but we keep our own homes clean. We deplete natural resources because the immediate personal benefits, such as standing under a hot shower for a long time, outweigh the seemingly long-term consequences of this activity. The whalers knew that if not them, then others would kill the whales, and they thought that by killing a few individuals, they would not cause any harm to their existence. This is precisely the tragedy: no one is doing what everyone should be doing, namely conserving resources. Individual elements of the tragedy of communal evictions formed the basis of laboratory games. Imagine that you are a student at Arizona State University and you are playing the game “Nuts”, authored by Julian Edney (1979). Several players, including you, are sitting around a shallow bowl containing 10 metal nuts. The experimenter explains the rules of the game to you. Your goal is to collect as many nuts as possible. Each of you can take as many nuts as you want at any time, and every 10 seconds the number of nuts remaining in the bowl will double. Will you leave the nuts in the bowl “so that there is something to double”, thereby creating an opportunity for everyone to “harvest” more? Probably not. If the students were not given the opportunity to negotiate and develop a “savings” strategy, 65% of the groups completed the game in less than 10 seconds, i.e. before the first replenishment of the nuts. Often, each of the players was in such a hurry to grab more nuts for themselves that the bowl ended up on the floor. Can we say that such individualism is unique to Americans? Kaori Sato provided students brought up in the traditions of Japanese, more collectivist culture, to cut down virtual forests for real money (Sato, 1987). When students divided equally the costs associated with its cultivation, they behaved in the same way as representatives of Western culture: more than half of the trees were cut down before they had time to grow to the most profitable size. The bowl of nuts in Edney and Les Sato’s experiments reminded me of the cookie jar in our house. During the week that passes between two shopping trips, we should save them, that is, spend them so that everyone can eat two or three things every day. But what really happened? The lack of rules and the fear that others would empty the jar without him led to each family member trying to eat as much as possible, thereby reducing the chances of others. The result: within 24 hours, the jar was emptied and stood empty until the next trip to the store. One possible solution to the problem is to announce how many cookies are in the jar. This would allow each family member to know exactly what his share is. If people do not know for sure what part of the resources they can rely on, they often consume more than they think (Herlockeretal., 1997). When 10 people are sitting at a table and a bowl of mashed potatoes is passed around, the chances are that many people will not limit themselves to a tenth, more than if a dish containing ten chicken legs is passed around. Laboratory games that reproduce the essence of the prisoner’s dilemma and the tragedy of communal evictions have some common features. Firstly, both of them push the players to situationally explain their behavior (“I was forced to protect myself from being exploited by my opponent”) and to dispositionally explain the behavior of their opponents (“She was greedy”, “He was not trustworthy”). Most players have not realized that the same fundamental attribution error is present in their opponents’ assessment of their own behavior (Gifford&Hine, 1997; Hine&Gifford, 1996).

(Don’t you think we did a good job?) When the war that Iran and Iraq fought for 8 years (1980-1988), which claimed a million lives and destroyed the economies of both countries, finally ended, it turned out that the border that caused it runs in the same place where it ran on the day the conflict began. Secondly, motivation often changes as the game progresses. At first, people are eager to earn as much easy money as possible, then they try to minimize their losses, and in the end they are concerned about how to avoid defeat and save face (Brockneretal., 1982; Teger, 1980). This transformation of motives is strikingly similar to what happened during the Vietnam War. At first, President Johnson’s speeches were filled with concern for democracy, freedom and justice. As the conflict escalated, the focus shifted to defending America’s honor and avoiding national humiliation, the inevitable consequence of losing the war. Thirdly, most real–life conflicts, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the tragedy of communal evictions, are non-zero-sum games. The gains and losses on both sides are not necessarily zero. Both can win or lose. Each game is a juxtaposition of the individual’s immediate interests against the well–being of the group as a whole and a diabolical social trap that demonstrates that even the result of an individual’s “rational” behavior can be harm. No one maliciously planned to increase the concentration of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere and its consequences – global warming. The selfish behavior of an individual does not always harm society. In many communities, for example, in the capitalist society of the 18th century, individuals who sought to optimize their own profits thereby contributed to meeting the needs of other members of society. Here is what the economist Adam Smith wrote about this: “We owe our dinner not to the kindness of the butcher, brewer or baker, but to their concern for their own interests” (Smith, 1776, p. 18).

How can people be encouraged to cooperate for their common benefit in situations that are truly social traps? Experts who have studied dilemmas in the laboratory suggest several ways (Gifford&Hine, 1997). Regulation. Reflecting on the tragedy of community evictions, Garrett Hardin wrote: “In a society that believes in the freedom of communal possessions, everyone pursues personal interests, and this pursuit leads to destruction. The freedom of communal possessions destroys everything” (Hardin, 1968). Think about this question: if paying taxes were voluntary, how many people would be willing to pay them in full? It is safe to say that there is not, and that is why modern societies cannot afford to depend on charity when it comes to schools, parks, as well as social and military security. The laws we adopt and the agreements we conclude are also aimed at achieving the common good. The International Whaling Commission defines agreed fishing standards for these animals, which save them from total destruction. The United States and the former USSR have signed a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, the purpose of which is to reduce the content of radioactive substances in the air we all breathe. Environmental legislation – if everyone is forced to comply with its requirements – distributes the burden of responsibility equally: no steel company should be afraid that other companies, its competitors, will benefit if they can neglect their obligations to the environment. “No one cares about what belongs to everyone, and the more owners there are, the less they care. Aristotle” Similarly, participants in laboratory games often look for ways to regulate their behavior in order to achieve the common good. The Nut players can agree not to take more than one or two nuts during one 10-second period of time and give the experimenter the opportunity to replenish their supply; they can also elect a leader and give him the right to decide how many nuts a particular player can take (Messicketal, 1983; Samuelsonetal., 1984). However, in real life, regulation comes at a cost. You have to pay for the development of norms and rules, and for their enforcement, as well as for the restriction of personal freedom. Therefore, a sensitive political question inevitably arises: what should be the costs of regulation so that they do not exceed the profits it brings? The less, the better. The second way to solve social dilemmas is to create small groups. In small communities, each individual feels more responsible and effective (Kerr, 1989). As the size of the group increases, so does the refusal to cooperate, usually justified by something like these words: “Nothing depends on me anyway” (Kerr&Kaufman-Gilliand, 1997). In small groups, people feel more involved in the overall success. Anything that enhances group identification contributes to more effective collaboration. Even a short discussion (just for a few minutes) or simply an individual’s belief that they are the same as the rest of the group can enhance “we-feeling” and cooperation (Brewer, 1987; Orbelletal., 1988). Members of small groups are less likely than members of large communities to appropriate a larger share of limited resources than others (Allison et al., 1992). On the island in the northwestern Pacific Ocean where I grew up, our small community shared a source of drinking water. On hot summer days, when the water level in the tank dropped, a light bulb lit up above it, which warned all our 15 families that water needed to be saved. Realizing our responsibility to each other and realizing how important this saving regime is, each of us behaved accordingly. The tank has never dried to the bottom. “I am convinced that the behavior of the Russians and Chinese is as much due to their distrust of us as ours is due to their distrust. And this probably means that we have a very noticeable influence on their behavior: by treating them as enemies, we justify their hostility. Member of the U.S. Senate J. William Fulbright” In much larger communities, such as in any city, voluntary self-restraint is less likely. Since the harm caused by an individual is distributed among many, he may neglect the significance of his personal act. That is why some political scientists and social psychologists argue that, where possible, large communities should be divided into smaller ones based on territorial principles (Edney, 1980). In his book Mutual Aid, published in 1902, the Russian revolutionary Peter Kropotkin painted an image of small communities, which he considered better suited for decision-making for the common good than the central government, which makes decisions based on consensus (Gound, 1988). Communication. To avoid falling into a social trap, people need to communicate. In the laboratory, group communication sometimes turns into mutual threats and insults (Deutsch &Krauss, 1960). However, much more often it leads to incomparably closer cooperation (Bornsteinetal., 1988; 1989). During the discussion of the dilemma, a group identification is forged that enhances concern for the well-being of the group. This also creates group norms and shared expectations, and group pressure forces group members to follow them. The discussions that are most conducive to cooperation are those that are conducted not through technical means of communication, but face to face (Bouas&Komorita, 1996; Dan&Morris, 2000; Kerretal., 1994; 1997;Pruitt, 1998). That this is indeed the case is confirmed by the results of a very ingenious experiment by Robin Dawes (Dawes, 1980, 1994). Imagine that a researcher offers you and each of the six other subjects you don’t know to receive $6 each. You can also give your money to others, knowing that the experimenter will double your share and give each of the 6 strangers 2 dollars. None of them will know if you’ve given up your $6 or not. If all seven of you join forces and give up on them, each of you will pocket 12 dollars. If you are the only one who refuses this offer, and the others agree with it, you will receive 18 dollars. If you agree and others refuse, you won’t get anything. It is clear that cooperation is beneficial to everyone, but it involves self-sacrifice and risk. According to Dawes, only 30% of the subjects agree to cooperate without discussion, and after discussion – about 80%. {To change the behavior of their citizens, many cities have changed the rules for using toll roads. Such an organization of traffic, in which a special high-speed lane is allocated on motorways for cars with several passengers, and at certain times of the day they are not charged for travel, makes collective trips profitable and individual trips unprofitable. (The text on the poster: “Left row. Only for vehicles with 2 or more passengers. Free of charge: from 6 to 10 and from 15 to 19”)} An open, honest and free discussion also increases the level of trust. Without communication, those who do not expect others to agree to cooperate also reject it (Messe&Sivacek, 1979; Pruitt&Kimmel, 1977). Those who do not trust are simply obliged to refuse to cooperate: otherwise they will not be able to protect themselves from exploitation. And the lack of cooperation, in turn, leads to even greater distrust (“What can I do? We live by the law of the jungle”). Laboratory research results show that communication increases the level of trust and creates conditions for reaching agreements that benefit all contracting parties. Material interest. When experimenters change the rules of the game in such a way that cooperation becomes economically beneficial, its popularity increases (Komorita&Barth, 1985; Pruitt&Rubin, 1986). Changing the “reward matrix” helps to solve real social dilemmas. In many cities, traffic jams on motorways and an increased concentration of harmful impurities in the air are a consequence of the fact that many citizens prefer to travel to and from work by car. Everyone knows that one car cannot significantly affect this picture. To make collective trips more attractive from a financial point of view, today many cities provide cars with at least two people with certain benefits in the form of a special express lane on the motorway or a reduction in tolls on it. Appeal to altruistic norms. People become less selfish when they feel more responsible for others. Based on this, is it possible to assume that an appeal to altruistic motives will encourage people to act for the common good? The research results are mixed. On the one hand, it seems that the mere knowledge of the dangerous consequences of non-cooperation has only a minor effect on him. The participants of the laboratory games, realizing that their selfish actions are detrimental to everyone, nevertheless continue to commit them. Outside the laboratory walls, in real life, warnings about the negative consequences of wasteful treatment of natural resources and calls for their conservation proved ineffective. Shortly after his election as President of the United States, Jimmy Carter recognized the need to treat the energy crisis as the “moral equivalent of war” and called on the nation to comply with the austerity regime. When summer came, it turned out that Americans had used up more gasoline than they had ever consumed before. At the beginning of this century, people were already aware of the impending “greenhouse effect,” and the number of environmentally friendly sports cars sold broke all records. Just as attitudes sometimes can’t influence behavior, so avoiding what’s good doesn’t always lead to good access. Nevertheless, most people adhere to the norms of social responsibility, reciprocity and justice and fulfill their obligations to society (Kerr, 1992). The problem is to encourage them to act in accordance with these norms. One of the possible ways to solve it is to create situations involving exactly such actions. Lee Ross and Andrew Ward asked educators working in a Stanford University dormitory to name male students who, in their opinion, were the most and least likely to cooperate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Ross&Ward, 1996). In fact, it turned out that both groups are equally inclined to cooperate. The name of the game had an extremely strong influence on the willingness to cooperate: if the researchers called it “Wall Street”, one third of the players cooperated, but if the game was called “Community”, there were already two thirds who wanted to cooperate. “In the history of human conflict, there has never been a situation where the majority owes so much to the minority. Sir Winston Churchill, Speech in the House of Commons on August 20, 1940.” Communication also contributes to the “awakening to life” of collectivist norms. When participants in laboratory games were given the opportunity to discuss, they often appealed to the norm of social responsibility: “If you fail us, you will be tormented by conscience for the rest of your days” (Dawesetal, 1977). Noticing this, researchers Robin Dawes and his colleagues preached a short sermon to the subjects about the benefits of cooperation, exploitation, and ethics before starting the “dilemma” game. The sermon had its effect: The participants of the game expressed their willingness to neglect short-term personal gain for the sake of the common good. (Remember that in chapter 12 we talked about how people who regularly listen to sermons in churches and synagogues are actively involved in charity – as volunteers and generous donors.) Are such appeals effective when dealing with large-scale dilemmas? Jeffrey Scott Mio and his colleagues found that theater visitors who read about the tragedy of community evictions littered less than visitors who read about participation in elections (Mioetal., 1993). Moreover, when the social benefits of cooperation are obvious, appealing to the norm of social responsibility brings success (Lynn&Oldenquist, 1986). For example, if people are convinced that public transport saves time, they are more likely to use it if they are also convinced that avoiding private cars reduces harmful emissions in the air (VanVugtetal., 1996). Supporters of the civil rights movement were willing to put themselves at risk of being insulted, beaten, or imprisoned in order to increase the number of marchers. During wars, people make great sacrifices for their groups. According to Winston Churchill, during the “Battle of Britain”, the pilots of the Royal Air Force behaved like real altruists: the people were deeply indebted to those who went into battle, knowing that the probability of death was very high – 70% (Levinson, 1950). Summing up, we can say the following: we have the opportunity to minimize the destructive consequences of falling into the traps of social dilemmas. To do this, you need to follow certain rules and regulations governing selfish behavior: you need small groups, giving people the opportunity to discuss social dilemmas, financially stimulating cooperation and appealing to altruistic norms. Source: Myers D. “Social Psychology” Photo: tildacdn.com